

# Quantum Weak Coin Flipping

Jérémie Roland

# Overview

- Introduction
  - Motivation
  - Problem statement
- Prior art
  - Protocols
  - Point games (TDPG, TIDPG)
- Contributions
  - Protocol with bias  $1/10$
  - Obtaining protocols with arbitrarily low bias
- Conclusion and outlook

Motivation

# Beyond QKD


Multi-party Computation  
(dishonest majority)




Two-party  
Secure Function Evaluation



Oblivious Transfer



Bit Commitment



Quantumly  
Impossible  
[Mayers 97,  
LoChau 97]

Classically all  
are impossible.

Coin Flipping



# Problem Statement

Strong CF, Weak CF, correctness and bias

# Problem Statement

**Coin Flipping (CF):** Alice and Bob wish to agree on a random bit remotely without trusting each other.

- **Strong Coin Flipping:** No player knows the preference of the other.
- **Weak Coin Flipping (WCF):** Each player knows the preference of the other.

# Situations

Honest player: A player that follows the protocol exactly as described.

Alice	Bob	Remark
Honest	Honest	Correctness
Cheats	Honest	Alice can bias
Honest	Cheats	Bob can bias
Cheats	Cheats	Independent of the protocol

**Bias** of a protocol: A protocol that solves the CF problem has bias  $\epsilon$  if neither player can force their desired outcome with probability more than  $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ .

# Situations | Weak CF

NB. For WCF the players have opposite preferred outcomes.

Alice	Bob	Pr(A wins)	Pr(B wins)
Honest	Honest	$P_A$	$P_B = 1 - P_A$
Cheats	Honest	$P_A^*$	$1 - P_A^*$
Honest	Cheats	$1 - P_B^*$	$P_B^*$

**Bias:**

$$\text{smallest } \epsilon \text{ s.t. } P_A^*, P_B^* \leq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$$

NB.

$$0 \leq \epsilon \leq \frac{1}{2}$$

# Situations | Weak CF | Flip and declare

Protocol: Alice flips a coin and declares the outcome to Bob.

Alice	Bob	Pr(A wins)	Pr(B wins)
Honest	Honest	$P_A = 1/2$	$P_B = 1/2$
Cheats	Honest	$P_A^* = 1$	$1 - P_A^* = 0$
Honest	Cheats	$1 - P_B^* = 1/2$	$P_B^* = 1/2$

**Bias:**      smallest  $\epsilon$  s.t.  $P_A^*, P_B^* \leq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \quad \implies \quad \epsilon = \frac{1}{2}$

# Prior Art

Bounds and protocols, Kitaev's Frameworks, Mochon's Breakthrough


# Bounds and Protocols

Classically:  $\epsilon = \frac{1}{2}$  viz. at least one player can always cheat and win.

Quantumly:

	Bound	Best protocol known
Strong CF	$\epsilon \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} - \frac{1}{2}$ [Kitaev 03]	$\epsilon \Rightarrow \frac{1}{4\sqrt{2}} - \frac{1}{2}$ [Ambainis 01] [Chailloux Kerenidis 09]
Weak CF	$\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ [Mochon 07] [Aharonov et al 16]	$\epsilon \rightarrow \frac{1}{6}$ [Mochon 05]


# Kitaev | Three Equivalent Frameworks






# Kitaev | Protocol | Definition

Protocol described by



- Initial (product) state  $|\psi_0\rangle_{AMB}$
- Unitaries  $U_i$  and projectors  $E_i$  alternating between
  - ★ Alice for  $i$  odd
  - ★ Bob for  $i$  even
- Final measurements (POVMs)
  - ★  $\{\Pi_A^{(0)}, \Pi_A^{(1)}\}$  for Alice
  - ★  $\{\Pi_B^{(0)}, \Pi_B^{(1)}\}$  for Bob
- We assume
  - ★ 0 means “Alice wins”
  - ★ 1 means “Bob wins”

# Kitaev | Protocol | Honest players



For honest players

- **Honest state:** The global state after step  $i$  is given by

$$|\psi_i\rangle = U_i U_{i-1} \dots U_1 |\psi_0\rangle$$

★ “Cheat detection” projectors  $E_i$  do not affect the “honest” state

- **Correctness:** Final measurements never yield different outcomes


$$\Pi_A^{(0)} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}} \otimes \Pi_B^{(1)} |\psi_n\rangle = \Pi_A^{(1)} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}} \otimes \Pi_B^{(0)} |\psi_n\rangle = 0$$

- **Balanced:** Each player wins with probability  $1/2$

$$P_A = \|\Pi_A^{(0)} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}} \otimes \Pi_B^{(0)} |\psi_n\rangle\|^2 = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$P_B = \|\Pi_A^{(1)} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}} \otimes \Pi_B^{(1)} |\psi_n\rangle\|^2 = \frac{1}{2}$$

# Kitaev | Protocol | Cheating Bob



If Bob is cheating (but Alice remains honest)

- Focus on the Alice-Message reduced state  $\rho_{AM,i}$
- Bob cannot affect the initial state

$$\rho_{AM,0} = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{B}}(|\psi_0\rangle \langle \psi_0|) = |\psi_{AM,0}\rangle \langle \psi_{AM,0}|$$

- For  $i$  odd, Alice is honest

$$\rho_{AM,i} = E_i U_i \rho_{AM,i-1} U_i^\dagger E_i$$


- For  $i$  even, Bob can apply any operation on  $\mathcal{M}$  but cannot affect  $\mathcal{A}$

$$\text{Tr}_{\mathcal{M}}(\rho_{AM,i}) = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{M}}(\rho_{AM,i-1})$$

- Bob tries to maximise the probability that Alice declares him to be the winner

$$\text{Tr}((\Pi_A^{(1)} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}}) \rho_{AM,n})$$

# Kitaev | Protocol | Cheating Bob




Bob's maximum cheating probability is given by an SDP

$$P_B^* = \max_{\rho_{AM,i}} \text{Tr}((\Pi_A^{(1)} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}}) \rho_{AM,n})$$

subject to

- $\rho_{AM,0} = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{B}}(|\psi_0\rangle \langle \psi_0|) = |\psi_{AM,0}\rangle \langle \psi_{AM,0}|$ ;
- for  $i$  odd,  $\rho_{AM,i} = E_i U_i \rho_{AM,i-1} U_i^\dagger E_i$ ;
- for  $i$  even,  $\text{Tr}_{\mathcal{M}}(\rho_{AM,i}) = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{M}}(\rho_{AM,i-1})$ .

# Kitaev | Protocol | Cheating Alice



Alice's maximum cheating probability is given by an SDP


$$P_A^* = \max_{\rho_{MB,i}} \text{Tr}((\Pi_B^{(0)} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}}) \rho_{MB,n})$$

subject to

- $\rho_{MB,0} = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{A}}(|\psi_0\rangle \langle \psi_0|) = |\psi_{MB,0}\rangle \langle \psi_{MB,0}|$ ;
- for  $i$  odd,  $\text{Tr}_{\mathcal{M}}(\rho_{MB,i}) = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{M}}(\rho_{MB,i-1})$ .
- for  $i$  even,  $\rho_{MB,i} = E_i U_i \rho_{MB,i-1} U_i^\dagger E_i$ ;

# Kitaev | Dual SDPs

We want to upper bound the cheating probabilities  
 $\Rightarrow$  Better to work with dual SDPs



$$P_B^* = \min_{Z_{A,i} \geq 0} \text{Tr}(Z_{A,0} |\psi_{A,0}\rangle \langle \psi_{A,0}|)$$

subject to

- for  $i$  odd,  $Z_{A,i-1} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}} \geq U_{A,i}^\dagger E_{A,i} (Z_{A,i} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}}) E_{A,i} U_{A,i}$ ;
- for  $i$  even,  $Z_{A,i-1} = Z_{A,i}$ ;
- $Z_{A,n} = \Pi_A^{(1)}$ .

$$P_A^* = \min_{Z_{B,i} \geq 0} \text{Tr}(Z_{B,0} |\psi_{B,0}\rangle \langle \psi_{B,0}|)$$

subject to

- for  $i$  even,  $\mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}} \otimes Z_{B,i-1} \geq U_{B,i}^\dagger E_{B,i} (\mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}} \otimes Z_{B,i}) E_{B,i} U_{B,i}$ ;
- for  $i$  odd,  $Z_{B,i-1} = Z_{B,i}$ ;
- $Z_{B,n} = \Pi_B^{(0)}$ .

# Kitaev | Three Equivalent Frameworks

Protocol

Constructive  $\Downarrow$   $\Uparrow$  Non-constructive

Time Dependent Point Game (TDPG)


Constructive  $\Downarrow$   $\Uparrow$  Constructive

Time Independent Point Game (TIPG)

# Kitaev | Time Dependent Point Game

For each  $i$ , construct the following graphical representation (frame)

- Set of weighted points on a 2D figure
- Point coordinates:  $(z_A, z_B)$ 
  - ★  $z_A$  runs over eigenvalues of dual variable  $Z_{A,i}$
  - ★  $z_B$  runs over eigenvalues of dual variable  $Z_{B,i}$
- Point weights:  $p_{z_A, z_B} = \langle \psi_i | \Pi^{[z_A]} \otimes \Pi^{[z_B]} | \psi_i \rangle$ 
  - ★  $|\psi_i\rangle$  is the honest state at step  $i$
  - ★  $\Pi^{[z_A]}$  is the projector on the corresponding eigenspace of  $Z_{A,i}$
  - ★  $\Pi^{[z_B]}$  is the projector on the corresponding eigenspace of  $Z_{B,i}$
- Notation
  - ★  $\text{Prob}[Z_{A,i} \otimes Z_{B,i}, |\psi_i\rangle] = \sum_{z_A, z_B} p_{z_A, z_B} \cdot (z_A, z_B)$






# Kitaev | TDPG | SDP constraints

SDP constraints


- Initialization
  - ★  $\frac{1}{2}(0, 1) + \frac{1}{2}(1, 0)$
- Point transitions
  - ★  $i$  odd  $\rightarrow$  Horizontal transition
  - ★  $i$  even  $\rightarrow$  Vertical transition
- Finalization
  - ★  $1 \cdot (\beta, \alpha)$  where
  - ★  $\alpha = P_A^*$  (Alice's cheating probability)
  - ★  $\beta = P_B^*$  (Bob's cheating probability)



# Kitaev | TDPG | SDP constraints

SDP constraints


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# Kitaev | TDPG | SDP constraints


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# Kitaev | TDPG | Naïve (wrong) protocol


- Ideally
  - ★ Zero bias  $\rightarrow$  Final point  $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$
- Naïve (wrong) protocol
  - ★ One horizontal transition
  - ★ One vertical transition
- Problem
  - ★ This transition is not valid
  - ★ For each line, coordinates of the center of mass can only increase



$$Z_{A,i-1} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}} \geq U_{A,i}^\dagger E_{A,i} (Z_{A,i} \otimes \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{M}}) E_{A,i} U_{A,i}$$

# Kitaev | TDPG | Naïve (wrong) protocol


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
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# Kitaev | TDPG | Naïve (wrong) protocol


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# Kitaev | TDPG | Naïve (wrong) protocol


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# Kitaev | TDPG | EBM transitions




**Validity condition: Expressible by matrices (EBM):**

- There exists  $\mathbf{G} \leq \mathbf{H}$  and  $|\psi\rangle$  such that the transition can be written

$$\text{Prob}[\mathbf{G}, |\psi\rangle] \mapsto \text{Prob}[\mathbf{H}, |\psi\rangle]$$

# Kitaev | TDPG | Valid transitions



Validity condition: Valid transition:

- For all  $\lambda \geq 0$

$$\sum_i p_i \frac{\lambda z_i}{\lambda + z_i} \leq \sum_i p'_i \frac{\lambda z'_i}{\lambda + z'_i}$$

# Kitaev | TDPG | EBM and valid transitions

(\*) Expressible By Matrices  
(EBM)

$$H \geq G, |\psi\rangle \text{ s.t.}$$

$$\text{Prob}[G, |\psi\rangle] \rightarrow \text{Prob}[H, |\psi\rangle]$$

Operator monotone function

$$f \text{ s.t.}$$

$$\forall H \geq G, f(H) \geq f(G)$$

Valid functions

$$\sum_{\text{final}} \frac{\lambda z}{\lambda + z} p_z \geq \sum_{\text{init}} \frac{\lambda z}{\lambda + z} p_z$$

$K$  : cone of EBM

$\xrightarrow{\text{Dual}}$

$K^*$  : cone of  
Operator Monotones


$\xrightarrow{\text{Dual}}$

$K^{**}$  : cone of  
valid functions

Lemma:  $K = K^{**}$



# Kitaev | TDPG | Valid transitions



Validity condition: Valid transition:


- For all  $\lambda \geq 0$

$$\sum_i p_i \frac{\lambda z_i}{\lambda + z_i} \leq \sum_i p'_i \frac{\lambda z'_i}{\lambda + z'_i}$$

# Kitaev | TDPG | Basic transitions


Merge ( $n_g \rightarrow 1$ ):

$$\langle x_g \rangle \leq x_h$$




Split ( $1 \rightarrow n_h$ ):

$$\frac{1}{x_g} \geq \left\langle \frac{1}{x_h} \right\rangle$$



Raise ( $n_g = n_h \rightarrow n_h$ ):


$$x_{g_i} \leq x_{h_i}$$



# Kitaev | TDPG | Example

Merge ( $n_g \rightarrow 1$ ):

$$\langle x_g \rangle \leq x_h$$



Split ( $1 \rightarrow n_h$ ):

$$\frac{1}{x_g} \geq \left\langle \frac{1}{x_h} \right\rangle$$

Raise ( $n_g = n_h \rightarrow n_h$ ):

$$x_{g_i} \leq x_{h_i}$$

The flip and declare protocol!

# Kitaev | TDPG | Example (2)

Merge ( $n_g \rightarrow 1$ ):


$$\langle x_g \rangle \leq x_h$$

Split ( $1 \rightarrow n_h$ ):

$$\frac{1}{x_g} \geq \left\langle \frac{1}{x_h} \right\rangle$$

Raise ( $n_g = n_h \rightarrow n_h$ ):

$$x_{g_i} \leq x_{h_i}$$



Spekkens Rudolph protocol (PRL, 2002)

Kitaev | TDPG | Example (3)

Merge ( $n_g \rightarrow 1$ ):


$$\langle x_g \rangle \leq x_h$$

Split  $(1 \rightarrow n_h)$ :

$$\frac{1}{x_g} \geq \left\langle \frac{1}{x_h} \right\rangle$$

Raise  $(n_g = n_h \rightarrow n_h)$ :

$$x_{g_i} \leq x_{h_i}$$



Best known explicit protocol:  
Dip Dip Boom (Mochon, PRA 2005)



# Kitaev | Three Equivalent Frameworks

Protocol

Constructive  $\Downarrow$   $\Uparrow$  Non-constructive

Time Dependent Point Game (TDPG)

Constructive  $\Downarrow$   $\Uparrow$  Constructive

Time Independent Point Game (TIPG)

# Kitaev | TIPG

Time Independent Point Game (TIPG):

- Key idea: Allow negative weights
- $h(x, y), v(x, y)$  s.t.  
 $h + v = \text{final frame} - \text{initial frame}$   
 $h, v$  satisfy a similar equation.

Mathemagic: For a valid TIPG there is TDPG with the same last frame.

Charm: Catalyst state.


# Mochon | Near-perfect WCF is possible

- Mathemagic: Family of TIPGs that yield

$$\epsilon = \frac{1}{4k + 2}$$

where  $2k =$  number of points involved in the non-trivial step.


- $k = 1$  yields the Dip Dip Boom protocol ( $\epsilon = 1/6$ ) protocol.
- Charm: Polynomials.



# Contributions

TEF, Blinkered Unitaries,  $1/10$  explicit, Elliptic-Monotone-Align Algorithm

# TEF



TDPG to Explicit protocol Framework (TEF):

A TDPG  $\rightarrow$  Protocol if

for each consecutive frame of a TDPG one can construct a  $U$  s.t.

$$\sum x_{h_i} |h_i\rangle \langle h_i| - \sum x_{g_i} E_h U |g_i\rangle \langle g_i| U^\dagger E_h \geq 0$$

and

$$U(\underbrace{\sum \sqrt{p_{g_i}} |g_i\rangle}_{|v\rangle}) = \underbrace{\sum \sqrt{p_{h_i}} |h_i\rangle}_{|w\rangle}.$$

# TEF | Blinkered Unitaries

For the Dip Dip Boom ( $\epsilon = 1/6$ ) protocol, we need a  $U$  that implements

- Split:  $1 \rightarrow n_h$
- Merge:  $n_g \rightarrow 1$

Claim:  $U_{\text{blink}} = |w\rangle \langle v| + |v\rangle \langle w| + \mathbb{I}_{\text{else}}$  can perform both.

Significance: Current best protocol from its point game directly.


# TEF | 1/10 Explicit

For initialising and the catalyst state we need

- Merge
- Split

and to climb down the ladder we need a special class


- $3 \rightarrow 2$
- $2 \rightarrow 2$ .



$$U_{3 \rightarrow 2} = |w_1\rangle \langle v_1| + (|v'_2\rangle + |w_2\rangle) \langle v'_2| + |v'_0\rangle \langle v'_0| + (|v'_2\rangle - |w_2\rangle) \langle w_2| + |v_1\rangle \langle w_1|$$

$$U_{2 \rightarrow 2} = |w_1\rangle \langle v_1| + (\alpha |v_1\rangle + \beta |w_2\rangle) \langle v_2| + |v_1\rangle \langle w_1| + (\beta |v_1\rangle - \alpha |w_2\rangle) \langle w_2|$$

# Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) Algorithm



Find a  $U$  s.t.

$$X_h \geq UX_g U^\dagger$$


and

$$U|v\rangle = |w\rangle$$

where  $X_h = \text{diag}(x_{h_1}, x_{h_2} \dots)$ ,  $|w\rangle \doteq (\sqrt{p_{h_1}}, \sqrt{p_{h_2}} \dots)^T$ .  
 $X_g$  and  $|v\rangle$  are similarly defined.



# EMA | Elliptic Representation



- Restrict to reals:  $U \rightarrow O$ .

- For  $X$  diagonal

$$\mathcal{E}_X = \{|u\rangle \mid \langle u| X |u\rangle = 1\}$$


is  $\vec{u}$  which satisfy  $\sum x_i u_i^2 = 1$ , viz. an ellipsoid.

- Generalises to all  $X > 0$ .

- $\underbrace{X_h}_H \geq \underbrace{OX_gO^T}_G$  means  $\mathcal{E}_H$  is contained in  $\mathcal{E}_G$  (containment is reversed).


# EMA | Elliptic Representation

- Imagine: Solution  $O$  is known, viz.
  - $O|v\rangle = |w\rangle$ .
  - $X_h \geq OX_gO^T$ .
- Suppose: Point of contact is  $|w\rangle$ .
- Observation:
  - $O|n_g\rangle = |n_h\rangle$ .
  - Inner ellipsoid more curved.




# EMA | Elliptic Representation

- Imagine: Solution  $O$  is known, viz.
  - $O|v\rangle = |w\rangle$ .
  - $X_h \geq OX_gO^T$ .
- Suppose: Point of contact is  $|w\rangle$ .
- Observation:
  - $O|n_g\rangle = |n_h\rangle$ .
  - Inner ellipsoid more curved.



# EMA | Elliptic Monotone-Align Algorithm

- 
- EBRM=EBM
  - Elliptic Representation
  - Weingarten Maps  
(to evaluate curvatures)

Given a  $k$  dimension problem:

- Tighten;
- Normals must coincide at the point of contact;
- The inner ellipsoid must be more curved than the outer ellipsoid,

which yields a  $k - 1$  dimension problem.

Apply iteratively and combine to get  $U$ .

Significance: Explicit protocol for Weak CF with  $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ .

# Conclusion

# Summary

- Framework for finding protocols from point games.
  - Split and Merge, basic moves in these games, exactly converted to unitaries
    - Bias 1/6 protocol
    - Catalyst State
  - Bias 1/10 protocol moves exactly determined
- Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) Algorithm.
  - A systematic way of finding unitaries for any valid move
  - Protocol for WCF with  $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$ .

# Summary

Classically:  $\epsilon = \frac{1}{2}$  viz. at least one player can always cheat and win.

Quantumly:

	Bound	Best protocol known
Strong CF	$\epsilon \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} - \frac{1}{2}$ [Kitaev 03]	$\epsilon = \frac{1}{4}$ [Ambainis 01]
Weak CF	$\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ [Mochon 07] [Aharonov et al 16]	$\epsilon \rightarrow \frac{1}{10}$ (analytic) [Mochon 05] $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ (algorithmic)

# Outlook

- *Resources.* Compile the 1/10 game into a neater protocol
- *Structure.* Relation between Mochon's polynomial assignment and the EMA solution
- *Simpler.* Study the Pelchat-Høyer point games and its moves
- *Robust.* Account for noise in the unitaries
  - EMA will run with finite precision; quantify its effect on the bias
- *Bounds.* Prove lower bounds on number of points needed for achieving a certain bias





[arXiv:1811.02984](https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.02984)

# Thank you

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# Resource Requirements

**COROLLARY 4.6.** *Assume there exists a TIPG with a valid horizontal function  $h = h^+ - h^-$  and a valid vertical function  $v = v^+ - v^-$  such that  $h + v = 1[\beta, \alpha] - \frac{1}{2}[0, 1] - \frac{1}{2}[1, 0]$ . Let  $\Gamma$  be the largest coordinate of all the points that appear in the TIPG game. Then, for all  $\varepsilon > 0$ , we can construct a point game with  $O(\frac{\|h\|\Gamma^2}{\varepsilon^2})$  valid transitions and final point  $[\beta + \varepsilon, \alpha + \varepsilon]$ .*

**5. Construction of a TIPG achieving bias  $\varepsilon$ .** In this section we construct for every  $\varepsilon > 0$  a game with final point  $[1/2 + \varepsilon, 1/2 + \varepsilon]$ . Moreover, the number of qubits used in the protocol will be  $O(\log \frac{1}{\varepsilon})$  and the number of rounds  $(\frac{1}{\varepsilon})^{O(\frac{1}{\varepsilon})}$ .

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